n April 1987, the first ever Missile Technology Control Regime was established by the United States. Formally established in April 1987, the MTCR aims to control the proliferation of long-range missile and other remotely piloted delivery systems which may be employed for biological, chemical, and nuclear warfare. Currently, the MTCR has been agreed upon by more than 25 countries in the world. It is supported by the United States and is implemented through the United Nations (UN).
The main goal of this international agreement is to restrict the export of technology relating to medium and long-range ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, components and parts, and components for nuclear weapons proliferation. This includes export controls for items including aircraft, automobiles, goods with military applications, components and tools, computer technology, and satellite technology. This article focuses on the application of controls to the exports of Chinese-designed missiles. The author discusses the reasons for the establishment of this regime, discusses potential restrictions that could be placed on exports of Chinese-designed ballistic missiles, and provides a review of the history and current practices regarding the export of technology relating to the MTCR.
The Missile Technology Control Regime imposed a number of export control guidelines on foreign nationals that seek to acquire technology to build ICBM missiles from the United States, Japan, or Russia. The goals of the United States and the MTCR are to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Asia and to prevent the transfer of advanced weaponry to rogue nations in the Middle East. The United States is concerned that the proliferation of ICBM missiles by China, Iran, or Syria would significantly increase the risk of attack from these countries and reduce the security of American citizens.
In the case of nuclear weapon transfers to rogue nations in Africa, Europe, or elsewhere, the Missile Technology Control Regime imposes a number of strong presumption guidelines and reporting requirements on relevant party nations. The United States will impose strong presumption rules covering the possible transfer of components or complete weapons that have been designed or tested in countries outside of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The United States will not provide financial assistance to these countries in any way if they are determined to be transferring nuclear weapons or components to those countries.
The MTCR has been implemented as a strong cooperative effort between the United States, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and China. Each of these partners has different incentives for working together. However, the overall goal of this regime is to reduce the proliferation of ballistic missile programs in Asia and to convince Beijing that its territorial claims are valid.
There are three main assumptions about what type of ICBM components may be exported under the MTCR. These assumptions include: the United States is acting as a guarantor for its own controlled items, the United States retains the inherent right to control or regulate the export of any item, and that the United States is not planning to export anything to the Chinese government if it does not want to do so. In practice, none of these assumptions hold water. There are currently zero United States-controlled items in the ICBM inventory of the United States. Moreover, there is no basis to believe that the United States is planning to restrict the export of Chinese-made ICBM components to the intended recipient.
There is also confusion regarding what types of nuclear devices the MTCR will prevent the Chinese from developing. There is some discussion that the Missile Technology Control Regime might prevent the development of solid-fuel ICBMs and ICBM launchers. However, this is legally incorrect. The Missile Technology Control Regime does not have the authority to ban the production of solid fuel ICBMs or restrict research and development on solid fuel ICBM capabilities. Additionally, there is no legal mandate that the United States would develop a nuclear deterrent if it did not want to do so. And the Missile Technology Control Regime cannot tell us what types of nuclear devices the Chinese might develop to shoot ICBM at our nation.
Does this mean that the United States will be left with no choice but to deploy more US nuclear war components into the region? It would depend upon which Chinese government officials you asked about this issue. The more likely scenario is that the Chinese will continue to work with North Korea in terms of missile capabilities. It is also possible that they will take advantage of the existing Missile Technology Control Regime to continue developing ICBM programs. The United States needs to make sure that we do not have a situation in which we have to deploy additional U.S. controlled items into the region if China does not agree to stop working with North Korea.